Herdr UI
Herdr의 TUI가 뛰어나며, 창을 통해 추가되는 기능
에이전트는 재시도를 제안할 수 있지만 스스로 승인할 수 없으며, 정책 게이트·인간 승인·검증 가능한 영수증을 브라우저에서 실행합니다
An agent can propose a retry, but cannot approve it itself. Policy gates, human approval, and verifiable receipts, running in your browser.
개발 도구TypeScript · JavaScriptGitHub @Kaagemusha온라인운영자 미확인
써 보셨어요? 한 번만 눌러 주세요. 로그인은 필요 없어요.
개인 계정의 공개 저장소 소유자는 GitHub로 로그인해 운영자를 확인하고 소개를 직접 관리할 수 있습니다. 관리자 승인은 필요하지 않습니다.
로그인한 뒤 확인 파일을 만들어 이 저장소의 기본 브랜치에 30분 안에 커밋해 주세요. 다른 브랜치나 포크의 파일은 인정하지 않습니다. 파일을 올린 뒤 아래에서 확인하면 관리자 승인 없이 관리할 수 있습니다. 자격을 유지하려면 파일을 남겨 두세요.
로그인이 필요하면 로그인 화면으로 이동합니다. 로그인 후 이곳으로 돌아와 원하는 확인 버튼을 다시 눌러 주세요.
프로젝트 폴더에서 /nomorevibe verify를 실행하면 소유권을 확인하고 소개를 직접 관리할 수 있습니다.
1분 만에 확인하기An agent's proposed action is not authorization: deterministic policy gates, operator approvals the agent's tools cannot create, and hash-bound, tamper-evident action receipts.
저장소 README에서 가져옴
README 전체를 불러오는 중입니다. 아래는 저장된 발췌입니다.
An agent's proposed action is not authorization. This is a small, inspectable
reference implementation that keeps can the tool act, *does policy allow
it*, who authorizes it, and was it verified as four separate,
independently checkable questions instead of one model decision.
Open the live console:
no install, three synthetic paths (allow / approval required / refuse), fully
interactive.README 전문 보기 ↗An agent's proposed action is not authorization. This is a small, inspectable reference implementation that keeps can the tool act, does policy allow it, who authorizes it, and was it verified as four separate, independently checkable questions instead of one model decision.
Open the live console: no install, three synthetic paths (allow / approval required / refuse), fully interactive.
Docs Build failed at 08:40. At 09:10 the agent proposes three next steps:
read Docs Build's failed run record -> allowed, runs now
retry Docs Build in the sandbox -> held for one human approval
delete Weekly Report's unpublished output -> refused by policy
An agent can hold a working tool and fresh evidence without holding authority to use that tool on this target, right now. Collapsing "can" and "may" into one model judgment call is how an agent talks itself into an action nobody approved. This repo keeps them apart with a closed action catalog, a deterministic policy gate, and approvals that none of the agent's tools can create.
docs/pair-walkthrough.md.npm run eval). The other 10 are 3 fault injections and 7
intended-path checks.npm run demo:attacks,
docs/attack-matrix.md).Requires Node.js 22+.
npm install
npm run check # public-safety, contract, one clean typechecked
# build, tests, evals, attack demo, demo and proof
# drift, responsive layout
npm run action -- demo --json
Serve docs/ with any static file server to run the console locally.
Context Layer Lab -> diagnose what current evidence supports
Governed Action Lab -> prepare/approve what may execute, under whose authority
-> execute/verify with what receipt
Context Layer Lab
(live diagnostic) answers
what the evidence supports. This repo answers what may execute given that
evidence, under whose authority, and with what receipt. They are one system in
two repos, not two unrelated projects. The real command sequence between
them, with real output, is in
docs/pair-walkthrough.md.
Status: reference implementation, not a production authorization system.
It demonstrates deterministic policy gates, operator approvals the agent's
tools cannot create, and hash-bound, tamper-evident action receipts as a
teaching and reference artifact. Digests are unkeyed SHA-256, not signatures:
they detect edits, but anything with write access to the approval store or
the receipts can produce valid-looking ones, so a real deployment keeps those
out of the agent's reach. It does not provide production identity, RBAC,
multi-tenancy, machine isolation, or a tamper-proof external log, and it has
not been hardened against adversarial misuse. There is no production, network, credential, financial,
or deletion adapter, and there never will be one in this repository. See
docs/architecture.md for the
full threat model.
docs/architecture.md: diagram, contracts, MCP
tools, evaluations, threat model, and full CLI reference.docs/attack-matrix.md: all 11 named attacks with
their taxonomy mapping, defended layer, and test.docs/adr/: 7 architecture decision records.docs/how-to-adopt.md: putting the pattern in front
of a real agent, autonomy levels L0 to L4, and what production still needs.docs/pair-walkthrough.md: the end-to-end
command sequence against Context Layer Lab, with captured output.Built with Claude Code and Codex under my direction. I set the design and approve every release; the two agents wrote and cross-reviewed much of the code. Every change passes CI and review before release.
MIT