new-term-radar
Daily radar for new AI terms: names of new models, products and repos, caught on X, Hugging Face, GitHub and sitemaps before keyword tools list them.
翻譯準備中
尚未偵測到更新。GitHub 發布版本後會顯示在這裡。
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正在載入完整 README。
檢視完整 README ↗Burn conviction. Tweet as clawd.
Someone burns ClawdViction (CV, the conviction points $CLAWD stakers earn on larv.ai) to open a session with clawd. They get 12 turns with Claude Opus 5.5 to shape one tweet, up to 4 gpt-image images, and up to 2 videos (Grok Imagine, or their own upload). When they're happy they press tweet. It passes a safety review and posts from @clawdbotatg. They can also walk away; the burn is final either way.
A Dutch auction that restarts on every tweet:
GET larv.ai/api/cv/highest).lib/price.ts is the whole curve; test/price.test.mjs pins it.
browser ──► Next.js on Vercel ──► larv.ai's Neon Postgres (schema btt)
│ /api/session burn CV via larv.ai /api/cv/spend
│ /api/worker/* job queue (bearer WORKER_SECRET)
▼
worker on the Mac (outbound-only poller, launchd)
├─ turn → claude -p (Opus 5.5), fully isolated → reply + draft
├─ image → reviewer checks prompt → gpt-image → JPEG
├─ video → (prompt check → Grok) → ffmpeg re-encode → reviewer
│ sees frames + Whisper transcript → mp4 to Vercel Blob
└─ post → guard + reviewer on exact text → X API → price resets
claude -p on the subscription, which
only exists on this machine. The worker only makes outbound calls, so
nothing is exposed.worker/claude.mjs) has no tools (--tools ""),
no MCP, no settings, no CLAUDE.md, no memory and no session persistence.
Its env is built from scratch, so the worker's Twitter, OpenAI and worker
keys never reach it, and it runs from an empty scratch dir. Its only
memory is agent/CLAWD.md: who clawd is, the voice, the ecosystem, and
the hard lines. One residual: Claude Code injects the logged-in account's
email into context, and no switch turns that off. The persona tells clawd
never to repeat it, and a live jailbreak test didn't leak it.worker/guard.mjs applies deterministic rules: 280
weighted chars, no hashtags, links only to allowlisted domains, no
addresses except $CLAWD's, no phishing bait. worker/safety.mjs is an
independent reviewer (agent/REVIEWER.md) that sees only the final text.
It fails closed. Image prompts are reviewed before generation too.app/api/session/[id]/video issues a one-file token) and the
worker does the rest (worker/video.mjs). Every video is re-encoded to
≤1280px H.264 with no metadata. That re-encode is what the reviewer sees and
exactly what posts: its sha256 is pinned on the session and re-checked at
post time. Generation needs XAI_API_KEY in the worker env; without it,
upload still works.worker/state/posted.json is the
worker's ledger, and results retry until they land.npm install && (cd worker && npm install)
# site: needs DATABASE_URL (the btt role), CV_SPEND_SECRET, WORKER_SECRET
DEV_FAKE_SPEND=1 npm run dev # fake spend works only in dev builds
# worker:
cp worker/.env.example worker/.env # API_BASE=http://localhost:3000
DRY_RUN_POST=1 node worker/worker.mjs # never posts to X
npm test
Deploy: Vercel (zero config) with env DATABASE_URL, CV_SPEND_SECRET,
WORKER_SECRET. Tables: DATABASE_URL=… node tools/migrate.mjs. Worker:
tools/install-worker.sh.
State lives in larv.ai's Neon Postgres, in its own btt schema, reached as
a btt role that has no access to larv.ai's tables. That role can't
read or change CV balances; spends still go through larv.ai's API.