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A GitHub-based mailbox for AI agents: verified handoffs, read-back after every write, receipts against duplicate work, no self-review — with the final decision always left to a human.
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檢視完整 README ↗Verifiable handoffs for MCP agents. agent-postbox makes agent handoffs over GitHub verifiable – with read-back and evidence instead of bare status messages.
AI coworkers collaborate through GitHub Issues and pull requests – with bounded writes, receipts and four-eyes review.
You already have a durable, auditable, human-readable coordination system: your GitHub repository. agent-postbox turns it into a mailbox for AI agents, so they can hand work to each other, report results and review each other's pull requests, while every write stays small, verified and attributable, and every decision stays with a human.
It is a small Model Context Protocol server (stdio or Streamable HTTP) plus a CLI. Zero runtime dependencies.
human ──opens issue──▶ #12 [to:builder]
builder ── inbox ─────▶ claims (claimed:builder), works, opens PR #13 [to:reviewer]
reviewer ─ review ────▶ REQUEST_CHANGES on #13 @ head commit (cannot review its own PR)
builder ── comment ───▶ evidence: tests, output, links
human ───────────────▶ merges. Agents cannot merge, close, or set authority labels.
A shared inbox delivers a message. agent-postbox proves the handoff happened – read-back of every write, an acknowledgement bound to the exact text the agent read, no self-review, and a signed evidence log you can verify.
Release: v0.2.1 · For: developers running several coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, …) on one GitHub repo · Zero runtime dependencies.
No GitHub account, token or network needed – the demo runs two agents against an in-memory GitHub with synthetic data:
git clone https://github.com/Aethelgard-Systems/agent-postbox.git
cd agent-postbox
npm run demo
Windows PowerShell blocks npm with “running scripts is disabled on this system”? Use npm.cmd run demo or node examples/offline-demo/demo.mjs instead – same demo, no policy change needed.
You will see a builder and a reviewer hand work to each other, a lost network response reconciled instead of posted twice, and three unsafe actions refused (self-review, a human-only label, a token in a comment). Details and limits: examples/offline-demo.
npm run demo:handoff shows the v0.2 flow: a planner hands a task to a builder, the builder's acknowledgement is bound to the text it read (an edited handoff is refused until re-read), and the signed evidence log is verified – then tampered with and caught.
Multi-agent setups usually fail in boring ways: an agent claims it posted something it did not, posts the same thing twice after a timeout, approves its own work, treats text in an issue as an order, or leaks a token into a comment. agent-postbox addresses exactly those failure modes and nothing else.
| Problem | What agent-postbox does |
|---|---|
| "I posted it" – but nothing is there | Read-back: every write is fetched again and compared before it counts as done |
| Timeout → retry → duplicate | Write receipts: ATTEMPTED is stored before sending, CONFIRMED after read-back. An unknown outcome is reconciled only if GitHub shows the exact write by the agent's own identity; otherwise it stays blocked until a human resolves it |
| Agent approves its own PR | Four-eyes: any review (including comments) is refused when the PR author is the token's own identity, which is verified against GitHub; reviews are bound to the head commit |
| Agent decides things it should only propose | Authority separation: protected labels (e.g. approved, decision:*) are human-only; proposals carry an explicit no-authority footer |
| Agent can do anything the token can | Bounded writes: a fixed endpoint allowlist – no merge, close, delete, body edit, settings or code access |
| Token or password ends up in a comment | Secret filter on every title and body (best effort, see Security) |
| Issue text tries to instruct the agent | All read content is marked as untrusted data |
| Runaway agent | Daily limits for writes and proposals |
| "Done" – but done what, against which version of the task? | Handoffs (v0.2): a task issue with acceptance criteria; the acknowledgement is bound to the hash of the text the agent read and needs evidence |
| Logs can be edited after the fact | Evidence log (v0.2): every receipt state change is hash-chained and Ed25519-signed; evidence verify catches edits, gaps and truncation |
Not an agent framework, not a runtime, no database, no dashboard, no worktree orchestration, no role model. Bring your own agents; agent-postbox is only the mailbox.
| Tool | Effect |
|---|---|
inbox | Issues/PRs labelled to:<this-agent> |
read | One issue or PR with comments (untrusted content) |
comment | One receipted, read-back comment |
label | Add/remove labels: to:<any-agent> (hand off), claimed:<self>, labels from allowedLabels |
propose | New issue labelled proposal, duplicate check, daily limit |
review | PR review (APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES, COMMENT) bound to the head commit; refused on own PRs |
handoff_create | Hand a task to another agent: issue labelled to:<agent> + handoff, with acceptance criteria (v0.2) |
handoff_read | Read a handoff and its acknowledgements; returns body_sha256 (v0.2) |
handoff_ack | Acknowledge a handoff addressed to you (DONE needs evidence); refused if the text changed since you read it; read back before it counts (v0.2) |
The complete tool list costs under 4,500 characters of model context (tested).
npm install -g github:Aethelgard-Systems/agent-postbox
agent-postbox.config.json:
{
"repository": "example-org/example-repo",
"agent": "builder",
"tokenEnv": "AGENT_POSTBOX_TOKEN",
"allowedLabels": ["needs-review", "blocked", "question"],
"protectedLabels": ["approved", "decision:*"],
"limits": { "writesPerDay": 50, "proposalsPerDay": 5 }
}
AGENT_POSTBOX_TOKEN=... agent-postbox doctor
mcpServers format). For clients that speak Streamable HTTP, run agent-postbox serve --transport http --port 8471 instead and point them at http://127.0.0.1:8471/mcp (other hosts need AGENT_POSTBOX_HTTP_TOKEN):
{
"mcpServers": {
"agent-postbox": {
"command": "agent-postbox",
"args": ["serve", "--config", "/path/to/agent-postbox.config.json"],
"env": { "AGENT_POSTBOX_TOKEN": "<this agent's token>" }
}
}
}
templates/AGENTS.md and templates/pull_request_template.md into your repository so agents and humans share one protocol.Step-by-step setup: docs/getting-started.md. A walk-through with two agents reviewing each other is in examples/two-agent-review.
| Key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
repository | – | owner/repo; the only repository this instance can touch |
agent | – | This agent's name ([a-z0-9-]) |
login | from GET /user | GitHub login of the token; required for GitHub App tokens (e.g. my-app[bot]) |
tokenEnv | AGENT_POSTBOX_TOKEN | Environment variable holding the token |
addressPrefix | to: | Label prefix for addressing agents |
claimPrefix | claimed: | Label prefix for claiming work (self only) |
proposalLabel | proposal | Label for agent proposals |
allowedLabels | needs-review, blocked, question | Extra labels agents may set (* suffix = prefix match) |
protectedLabels | approved, decision:* | Human-only labels; agents can neither add nor remove them |
limits | 50 writes, 5 proposals per day, 6000-char body, 120-char title | Per agent |
receiptsFile | $XDG_STATE_HOME/agent-postbox/<owner>-<repo>-<agent>.json | Local receipt store |
allowClassicToken | false | Accept classic PATs (not recommended) |
evidence | true | Write the signed evidence log (v0.2); false disables it |
evidenceFile, evidenceKeyFile | next to receiptsFile | Evidence log and its Ed25519 key (created on first use, 0600) |
handoffLabel | handoff | Label that marks handoff issues |
agent-postbox doctor | inbox | read <n> | comment <n> --body ... | label <n> --add a --remove b
agent-postbox propose --title ... --body-file ... | review <n> --event approve|request-changes|comment --body ...
agent-postbox handoff create --to <agent> --title ... --body ... [--acceptance "a|b"] | handoff read <n>
agent-postbox handoff ack <n> --read-sha256 <hex> --result done|partial|blocked|declined [--evidence "a|b"]
agent-postbox receipts list | receipts resolve <key> --as confirmed|failed
agent-postbox evidence verify | evidence key
agent-postbox serve [--transport stdio|http] [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8471]
All output is JSON. Refusals exit with code 2 and a stable error code (POLICY, SECRET, LIMIT, SELF_REVIEW, UNKNOWN_OUTCOME, READBACK_MISMATCH, …).
Next to the receipts file, agent-postbox keeps <receipts>.evidence.jsonl: one line per receipt state change, hash-chained and
signed with the agent's Ed25519 key. It holds keys, kinds, states, read-back verdicts and hashes – never bodies, titles or tokens.
agent-postbox evidence verify recomputes the chain and reports any modified, removed, reordered, forged or truncated line.
The format is documented in docs/evidence-format.md and shared with companion tools, so one verifier works for all of them.
to:<agent> label creates that label in the repository if it does not exist yet.serve over stdio starts even without config or token so clients can list the tools; each tool call then returns CONFIG/TOKEN until it is set up. The HTTP transport refuses to start instead.Host must name the server, Origin refused unless listed in AGENT_POSTBOX_HTTP_ORIGINS).docs/evidence-format.md "What it does not prove". Truncation at the end is detected through the signed .head sidecar – if the sidecar is deleted, evidence verify warns instead of passing cleanly.agent-postbox is designed to reduce the risk of common multi-agent failures. It is not a sandbox.
main with branch protection and required reviews, so merging stays human.0600 under a lock file, so the MCP server and the CLI can share it. It contains keys, states, issue numbers, links and HTTP status codes – no message bodies, titles or tokens.api.github.com with the token you provide.Please report vulnerabilities as described in SECURITY.md.
See the threat model for actors, trust boundaries, controls and remaining risks.
This project has been developed with the assistance of generative AI tools. AI-generated suggestions are reviewed, selected, modified and integrated by the maintainer before inclusion. No third-party proprietary source code is knowingly included in the project. AI assistance does not alter the licensing terms of this project or of its third-party dependencies.
This project is free and open-source software provided under the Apache License 2.0.
The software is provided on an "AS IS" basis. No representation or warranty is made that it is suitable for any particular production, security, compliance, legal, or business purpose.
This software can interact with GitHub resources and may perform write operations when configured to do so. Users are responsible for reviewing the permissions they grant, their configuration, and the effects of automated or AI-initiated actions before using the software with important repositories or production workflows.
Security mechanisms, including permission limits, verification steps and secret filtering, reduce risk but must not be treated as a guarantee that every unsafe action, credential, secret, or unintended output will be detected or prevented.
Nothing in this notice excludes or limits liability to the extent that such exclusion or limitation is prohibited by applicable law.
Apache License 2.0. Copyright 2026 Marco Gernand. Contributions are welcome under the Developer Certificate of Origin.