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The coding-agent plugin that bills 52% of a bare model across 20 live tasks. Terse persona + tool-output compressor + context diet.
Give AI coding agents isolated sandboxes to clone, build, test, and push over authenticated MCP, with credentials kept out of the executor.
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Remote coding harness exposed as a secure Streamable HTTP MCP server
Translation pending
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Read the full README ↗Cloud Harness MCP is an MIT-licensed remote coding harness exposed through authenticated Streamable HTTP MCP. It opens an isolated clone in a TTL-limited Docker executor and gives a trusted owner or named mutually trusted operators structured workspace, file, code-intelligence, command, shell, session, dependency-task, Git, worktree, skill, hook, memory, and repository-defined deployment tools.
[!WARNING] This is a private service for one security domain. Its operators must trust one another because it is intentionally capable of arbitrary command execution inside a shared-kernel executor. Principal isolation is not a hostile multi-tenant sandbox. Read the security model before operating it.
The Managed OAuth MCP URL is:
https://harness.zuey.me/mcp
Static-header clients use dashboard-managed API keys at the separate gateway:
https://api.harness.zuey.me/mcp
MCP is the northbound control protocol; the harness is the execution runtime. The split keeps Internet-facing request handling away from Docker authority and keeps repository credentials out of long-lived executors.
flowchart LR
OAuthClient["Managed OAuth client"] -->|"Access OAuth"| Nginx["nginx + loopback ingress"]
StaticClient["Static-header client"] -->|"managed API key"| Gateway["Cloudflare Worker gateway"]
Gateway -->|"Access service assertion + API key"| Nginx
subgraph Control["Trusted control plane"]
Nginx --> API["Stateless MCP API"]
API -->|"private authenticated RPC"| Runner["Runner · policy · lifecycle"]
Runner --> Store[("SQLite workspace state")]
Runner --> Docker["Docker authority"]
Runner --> Broker["GitHub App broker"]
end
subgraph Execution["TTL-bound execution plane"]
Docker --> Executor["Non-root workspace executor"]
Docker --> GitHelper["Ephemeral Git transfer helper"]
Executor --> Repo[("Isolated repository clone")]
end
Broker -->|"short-lived token over stdin"| GitHelper
GitHelper -->|"validated HTTPS origin"| GitHub["GitHub repository"]
Executor -.->|"no control-plane credential"| GitHub
The source of truth for these boundaries is
compose.yaml,
apps/runner/src/workspace-service.ts,
and the security model.
sequenceDiagram
participant C as AI client
participant A as MCP API
participant R as Runner
participant E as Isolated executor
participant G as Ephemeral Git helper
participant H as GitHub
C->>A: workspace_open(repositoryUrl, idempotencyKey)
A->>R: authenticated operation
R->>G: constrained clone + optional short-lived token
G->>H: credential-free or GitHub App HTTPS clone
R->>E: start bounded workspace container
R-->>C: opaque workspaceId
C->>E: inspect, edit, test, session, task graph, commit
C->>R: git_push(refspec, forceWithLease?, expectedRemoteOid?)
R->>G: stage clean bare transfer + short-lived token
G->>H: origin-only push
G-->>R: bounded sanitized result
R-->>C: structured MCP result
C->>R: workspace_close(workspaceId)
R->>E: terminate and remove
Remote fetch, pull, and push use a sibling transfer repository that the executor cannot see. Push requires a GitHub App installation with repository write access; clone/fetch/pull need read access. See configuration and MCP semantics.
workspace_open with a credential-free HTTPS
repository URL and a fresh idempotency key. Keep the returned opaque
workspaceId; do not derive it from a path or repository name.workspace_close.Start with the normal workflow in MCP usage for lifecycle, cursor, network, and Git-transfer semantics.
In addition to the remote HTTP/Docker service, Cloud Harness MCP can operate directly against an explicitly selected project folder on your local machine over stdio transport.
# Start local stdio server for a project:
cloud-harness-mcp --transport stdio --workspace /path/to/project
In local mode:
workspaceId). workspace_open is not required.workspace_close terminates owned child processes and tasks but never deletes your local project folder.exec_run, shells, tasks) execute with host-user permissions. File path confinement is not an OS sandbox.git_fetch, git_pull) and Git push (git_push) are disabled by default and require explicit startup opt-in flags (--git-network, --git-push).This is the beginning of the README. Read the rest at the original. Read the full README ↗