scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

Own Secure Boot keys, a sealed signed UKI, and a disk that opens only with TPM2 PIN + FIDO2 PIN + touch. Qubes-inspired Anti Evil Maid, on Fedora Atomic.

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Latest code update: Oct 27; Active repository
Latest version: iso-20261026-2023; Installer 20261026-2023 · Oct 27
Contributors: 1; Forks 0
Listed on nomorevibe: Nov 10; Repository created October 2026

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Oct 27Installer 20261026-2023GitHub release ↗
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Operator: @wildcommitter ↗GitHub repository owner
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Repository: wildcommitter/fedora-secureblue-tpm-fido2 ↗Public · Active
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Category: Security
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Technology stack: Python
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scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

Own Secure Boot keys, a sealed signed UKI, and a disk that opens only with TPM2 PIN + FIDO2 PIN + touch. Qubes-inspired Anti Evil Maid, on Fedora Atomic.

SecurityPython · ShellGitHub @wildcommitterOnlineOwner unconfirmed

Visit project GitHub

Have you tried it? One tap is enough. No sign-in needed.

Availability: Online; 30-day uptime 100%
Latest code update: Oct 27; Active repository
Latest version: iso-20261026-2023; Installer 20261026-2023 · Oct 27
Contributors: 1; Forks 0
Listed on nomorevibe: Nov 10; Repository created October 2026

Languages

Python 43.7%
Shell 38.3%
Go 14.6%
Dockerfile and others 3.4%

Updates3 in the last 30 days

All

Oct 27Installer 20261026-2023GitHub release ↗
Oct 19Installer 20261019-1457GitHub release ↗
Oct 18Installer 20261017-2033GitHub release ↗

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Operator: @wildcommitter ↗GitHub repository owner
Website: wildcommitter.github.io/fedora-secureblue-tpm-fido2 ↗
Repository: wildcommitter/fedora-secureblue-tpm-fido2 ↗Public · Active
Site and repository: Repository links to this site
Category: Security
Access: Website
Technology stack: Python
Information refreshed: Nov 10GitHub

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Path	What	Docs
`image/`	The OS image: secureblue Sericea + scroll, bootc/composefs, systemd-boot, a sealed UKI signed with our own keys. Includes install, key handling and the pre-install checklist	`image/README.md`
`image/files-luks/`	tokenvault: boot-time disk unlock. You enter the TPM2 PIN and the FIDO2 PIN and touch the key; together they open a vault on the ESP that holds the root keyslot's passphrase	`image/LUKS.md`
`vmgui/`	VM windows, Qubes-style: apps in KVM guests show up as scroll windows framed in the VM's color, over vsock (no network to the host), from a confined waypipe in a compositor-enforced security context. The host keeps only a bare KVM/libvirt set	`vmgui/README.md`
`vmswitch/`	Guest networks and USB: a switch made of TAP devices and one nftables table (guests share a network on demand; `uplink` = internet only), USB devices handed to guests through usbguard, and `vmtui`, a terminal tree table to drive both (Super N)	`vmswitch/README.md`
`lockscreen/`	hardened-unlock: the scroll lock screen. Unlock needs the FIDO2 key PIN, a touch and the account password, each asked separately	`lockscreen/README.md`
`docs/`	The public site (GitHub Pages): landing page, disk unlock, own Secure Boot keys, Qubes OS comparison, threat model	https://wildcommitter.github.io/fedora-secureblue-tpm-fido2/
`.github/workflows/build.yml`	CI: builds and signs the image with the `signing` environment's secrets, then publishes the installer ISO	`image/README.md` → Who signs what
`SECURITY.md`	How to report vulnerabilities privately
`test/`	KVM e2e for tokenvault (`test/bootc`: OVMF Secure Boot, swtpm, virtual FIDO2 key) and the shared harness and virtual key (`test/e2e.py`, `test/vfido`)	`image/LUKS.md` → Tests

Path	What	Docs
`image/`	The OS image: secureblue Sericea + scroll, bootc/composefs, systemd-boot, a sealed UKI signed with our own keys. Includes install, key handling and the pre-install checklist	`image/README.md`
`image/files-luks/`	tokenvault: boot-time disk unlock. You enter the TPM2 PIN and the FIDO2 PIN and touch the key; together they open a vault on the ESP that holds the root keyslot's passphrase	`image/LUKS.md`
`vmgui/`	VM windows, Qubes-style: apps in KVM guests show up as scroll windows framed in the VM's color, over vsock (no network to the host), from a confined waypipe in a compositor-enforced security context. The host keeps only a bare KVM/libvirt set	`vmgui/README.md`
`vmswitch/`	Guest networks and USB: a switch made of TAP devices and one nftables table (guests share a network on demand; `uplink` = internet only), USB devices handed to guests through usbguard, and `vmtui`, a terminal tree table to drive both (Super N)	`vmswitch/README.md`
`lockscreen/`	hardened-unlock: the scroll lock screen. Unlock needs the FIDO2 key PIN, a touch and the account password, each asked separately	`lockscreen/README.md`
`docs/`	The public site (GitHub Pages): landing page, disk unlock, own Secure Boot keys, Qubes OS comparison, threat model	https://wildcommitter.github.io/fedora-secureblue-tpm-fido2/
`.github/workflows/build.yml`	CI: builds and signs the image with the `signing` environment's secrets, then publishes the installer ISO	`image/README.md` → Who signs what
`SECURITY.md`	How to report vulnerabilities privately
`test/`	KVM e2e for tokenvault (`test/bootc`: OVMF Secure Boot, swtpm, virtual FIDO2 key) and the shared harness and virtual key (`test/e2e.py`, `test/vfido`)	`image/LUKS.md` → Tests

scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

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Updates3 in the last 30 days

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scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

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Updates3 in the last 30 days

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Introduction

README

hardening

README

README

hardening

scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

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Updates3 in the last 30 days

Comments

Trending in Security

scroll-secure: a Linux workstation that won't unlock for a tampered boot

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Updates3 in the last 30 days

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Trending in Security

Introduction

README

hardening

README

README

hardening