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An open record format for plant and animal genetics. Date a record of what you hold without showing anyone the genetics. Free to check, no sign-up.
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An open format for records of plant and animal genetic material — canonical serialisation, commitments, batch inclusion proofs, attestations and corrections. Specification, conformance vectors and reference implementation.
Taken from the repository README
Loading the full README.
Read the full README ↗veilcore-records on npm · Apache-2.0 · SPEC.md ·
An open format for dated records of plant and animal genetic material. A record's fingerprint is plain SHA-256 over a canonical serialisation, so anyone can check that a record is unaltered: in any language, offline, with nothing from us. No account, no service, no fee.
flowchart LR
A["Breeder's device<br/>writes the record"] -->|"SHA-256 over<br/>canonical JSON"| B["Fingerprint<br/>(32 bytes)"]
B -->|"batched with others"| C["Anchored on a ledger<br/>(VeilCore uses Midnight)"]
A -. "record stays private,<br/>shown only to who it chooses" .-> D["Examiner, buyer, court"]
C -->|"date"| D
D -->|"recompute the fingerprint,<br/>offline, any language"| E{"Same?"}
Node 20 or later. Download the example record and check it:
curl -sO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hunterincoming/veilcore-sdk/main/examples/record.json
npx veilcore-records verify record.json
vc_rec_example_01
commitment holds
b14a81acd4bcb71e3931999e18b79f4945295d57c44f06ecc069482a98abb8e3
attestations none
Nobody outside the holder has vouched for this record. That is not a
fault, but it means the contents rest on the holder's own assertion.
anchors none
dating This record states no anchor that could be checked. Its date rests on whoever holds it, not on anything independent.
Verified.
Now edit the variety's name in record.json (say "Harbour Mist (example)" to "Harbour Mist (edited)") and run it again:
vc_rec_example_01
commitment DOES NOT HOLD
reason commitment does not match contents
recorded b14a81acd4bcb71e3931999e18b79f4945295d57c44f06ecc069482a98abb8e3
computed f1ba7c0d4da55a7f73fd8b35da2b1aff822f898d6d20a7e4295ce5bd77405d03
...
FAILED.
Exit status is 0 when it holds and 1 when it doesn't, so it drops into a script. The example isn't anchored, so the output says its date rests on the holder: dating is the separate step in the diagram, and a record that names an RFC 3161 timestamp has it checked offline too.
conformance/impl.py),
Rust (veilcore-rs, which computes the animal
and strain records' fingerprints and leaves the two profiles' 50 refusals to this package). We wrote all
three; one written by someone else is the test the format still needs.This proves a record hasn't changed since it was sealed. It doesn't prove the contents are true; lab signatures and the anchor's date are for that.
A breeder cannot prove they held a variety first without showing the genetics. An examiner cannot confirm a test was run without taking custody of data they would rather not hold. A laboratory cannot demonstrate chain of custody without exposing its client list. In each case the party holding the evidence has to overshare or establish nothing. This format is for proving what a record said and when it existed, and a specific claim about it, without handing over the underlying data.
npx veilcore-records verify record.json
It reports whether the commitment holds, what the attestations establish, and what the
anchor does and does not date. seal, diff, canonical and inclusion are the other
commands; npx veilcore-records lists them. From a clone, node bin/veilcore.mjs does the same.
The people who need to check a record are examiners, control officials and analysts. Asking them to write a script is asking them not to check.
npx veilcore-records backup "VeilCore backup 2026-10-23.json" --out my-records
A backup saved from the VeilCore web app since 23 October 2026 carries each record's sealed
fields and inclusion proof. This checks every record in it (fingerprint, proof, and which
transaction dates its batch) and, with --out, writes each record's files to a folder. It
asks for the password if the file has one, and never prints a key. It's how a holder shows
their records if VeilCore's site and registry are gone.
npx veilcore-records deal "VeilCore backup 2026-10-23.json"
Checks every signed message of each license deal in a backup (or one deal record from the app's "Download the deal's record") and totals what both sides signed as paid and received: the payer's own signatures, not the payee's spreadsheet. It also says what it can't show: who holds the keys. Confirm with the licensee before relying on it (SPEC 11.10).
From code:
import { verifyCommitment } from 'veilcore-records';
const result = await verifyCommitment(record);
// { valid: true, computed: '33aaa590...' }
An RFC 3161 timestamp anchor is checked offline, with WebCrypto and no dependencies:
verifyAnchor(record, anchor) verifies the token's imprint against the commitment, its
signature, and its signer's time-stamping key usage, and reports genTime. It does not
check the TSA's certificate chain, its qualified status on an EU trusted list, or
revocation, and says so in every result. Other anchor kinds are reported as lookups.
Verification proves the record is unaltered since sealing. It does not prove the contents are true — that is what attestations and the anchor's date are for. The format is careful about this distinction throughout, because a format that blurs it is worth less than no format at all.
Integrating VeilCore — start here if you are adding this to existing software. A laboratory keeps its own system and adds a commitment to records it already creates.
Records in evidence — for counsel. What a party can establish, how it is authenticated across jurisdictions, and what it does not prove.
The specification — record structure, canonical serialisation, the commitment procedure, anchoring, corrections, attester identity, verification. Written for implementers rather than users of this package.
Evidence packages. buildEvidencePackage({ record, proof, opentimestamps }) produces
one folder for a lawyer, examiner or court: the record, its inclusion proof, the batch root
and its OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin) file, a plain-English guide, a declaration template for
counsel to adapt, and verify.py - this package's Python reference implementation,
standard library only - which checks it all offline with python3 verify.py. Nothing in
it depends on VeilCore still existing.
The package's MANIFEST.json (the SHA-256 of every file) catches accidental damage only:
a truncated copy, a re-saved file. It does not catch deliberate editing, because it sits
in the same folder and whoever edits a file can rewrite it too. What deliberate editing
cannot get past is the commitment recomputed from record.json and that commitment's
anchor. A signature over the manifest would not change this: the package builder is the
holder, the same party who could edit the files, and verify.py (Python standard library
only) has no Ed25519 to check one with.
Worked examples in examples/: adding commitments to a laboratory's existing intake
process, an Additional Certification Requirement end to end, and establishing
distinctness between two varieties.
A commitment is plain SHA-256 over a canonical serialisation, so any implementation in any language reproduces it. Anchoring to a chain is a separate step, and only that step is chain-specific.
Three implementations in different languages pass the same 121 conformance vectors (100
for the record format, one for the report pairing of SPEC 3.7, dnaPairBinding, and 20
for records that name their own key, SPEC 3.6.1): this
package (TypeScript), a Python implementation in conformance/impl.py, and a Rust
implementation at https://github.com/hunterincoming/veilcore-rs. All three have the same
author. An implementation by an unrelated party is the test this format still needs.
Thirty more vectors cover the animal profile (SPEC 11.8, final): five animal records,
whose fingerprints all three compute exactly as any record's, and twenty-five sets of fields
the profile refuses, which this package (computeAnimalRecordFingerprint,
animalIndividualProblems) and the Python implementation check. The Rust implementation
computes the fingerprints and doesn't check the profile; run it with
--without-animal-profile.
Thirty more do the same for the strain and line profile (SPEC 11.9, final: microbial
strains, fungi, cell lines, insect lines): computeStrainRecordFingerprint and strainProblems
here, strain_record_fingerprint in Python, --without-strain-profile for Rust.
Thirty-six more for the document profile (SPEC 11.11, final: a permit, a COA, a contract,
sealed by each file's SHA-256, and a certificate's numbers as a field set): computeDocumentRecordFingerprint and documentProblems
here, document_record_fingerprint in Python, --without-document-profile for others.
npm test
Runs the unit tests, the check harnesses and the vectors against this implementation. To run them against another:
node conformance/run-cli.mjs "python3 conformance/impl.py"
The vectors cover canonicalisation, commitments, what an implementation must REFUSE, the inclusion fold, the bytes an attester signs, and field sets. The attestation set was added in September 2026, after this implementation was found to sign an attester's key while leaving their display name and claimed accreditation outside the signature — anyone holding a genuine attestation could rewrite those and it still verified. Three implementations agreeing on how to hash a record says nothing about whether they agree on what a signature protects, and until there were vectors for it, nothing asked. The field-set vectors (SPEC 4.5: sixteen values committed one by one, so a holder can later prove one fact about one value on chain without showing the rest) were added in October 2026.
Section 5 was written from a clean-room test. Given only that section — no code, no vectors, no conversation — a language model produced a Go implementation that reproduced every published batch root and folded every published proof, 19 of 19. It inferred path direction assignment correctly, which the specification never states: it describes how to fold a path and not how to build one. The gaps that test exposed are now in the text.
The conformance suite ships a deliberately broken implementation, so anyone can confirm the suite catches failures rather than passing everything.
A commitment is worthless if two implementations hash the same record differently.
anchor and terms are excluded by definitionThree layers. The envelope is domain-blind: no field in it names a crop, an animal, or any subject-specific concept. The profile carries the subject fields. The disclosure vocabulary names what a holder can grant.
The test for any proposed envelope field: would a Dutch orchid propagator, a wagyu herd book and a microbial culture collection all need it?
Write a JSON schema listing your fields, publish it at a path you control, and name it in
profile. There is no registry of profiles, because a registry of profiles is a body
that can refuse one.
Published here: plant-variety-v1, seed-lot-v1, tissue-culture-accession-v1 and cannabis-v0.1.
The commitment above establishes that a whole record is unaltered. Establishing a single claim — that a sealed figure meets a threshold, that two records differ at k or more fields — without disclosing the record needs a per-field commitment scheme.
Section 4.5 of the specification defines one: field sets, up to sixteen values committed
as separate leaves. The claims themselves (value, range, distinct, unchanged) are proved
by VeilCore's claims contract, on Midnight mainnet since 8 October 2026 at
ef763eb4ad1846b716dbfa90c00560a9a943ffb4d1fc638b0707df5adefd070d (no maintenance key).
examples/acr-trait-verification.mjs and examples/distinctness.mjs show what a
certifying body receives and what stays with the holder.
The package is ESM (import). require('veilcore-records') also works on Node versions
that load ES modules through require (20.19 and later, 22.12 and later); on older Node,
use import(). Attestation signatures use the global WebCrypto with Ed25519 (Node 20 and
later); the tests run on Node 22.
Every verify… function returns a failed result for malformed input (a reason, false
or ok: false) and does not throw. Builders (computeCommitment, buildBatch,
buildEvidencePackage, sign…) throw on invalid input, with the reason.
Releases: see RELEASING.md for the build gate and npm provenance.
Published for comment. The specification is stable enough to implement against and specific correction is more useful than general agreement — section 13 says where review is most needed.
How the format changes: a record that verifies today keeps verifying; what counts as a breaking change and how one is decided; and what has to be true before the format is called 1.0.
Apache-2.0