dumbtv
dumbtv takes the ads, screen tracking and update nags out of your Fire TV over ADB. No root, none of your apps touched, every step can be undone. Free and open source.
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A customer's security review is holding up the deal. An AI security engineer finds what an attacker could actually reach and writes the fix; an AI pentester proves it by breaking in. You approve every
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安全Go · TypeScriptGitHub @ClatTribe在线运营者未确认
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一分钟完成验证Go-native L1 OSS security + compliance engine
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取自仓库 README
正在加载完整 README。 以下为已保存的摘录。
Go-native, two-layer security + compliance engine with evidence-grounded autonomous agents.查看完整 README ↗
Go-native, two-layer security + compliance engine with evidence-grounded autonomous agents.
cloud-investigate) — attack-path reachability + verified remediation.web-investigate) — live exploitation; SQLi/XSS/open-redirect/path-traversal/cmdi; signed evidence bundle.llm-redteam) — jailbreak / secret-leak / tool-misuse, verified by tripwire.Each agent ships with an anti-circularity bench (procedurally-generated vulnerable + decoy targets): 100% recall, 0 false positives across seeds — the grounding is proven, not claimed.
Paired with webappsec (the SaaS wrapper that consumes tsengine output and talks to the service's /replay API).
# (cutting a release? see RELEASE.md — one v* tag fires two workflows and publishes twelve artifacts)
# build the version-stamped CLI
make cli # → ./bin/tsengine
./bin/tsengine version
# get the sandbox image (OSS tools live here, not on the host).
# PULL the published one (~5.8 GB, every scanner):
docker pull ghcr.io/clattribe/tsengine/sandbox:full-latest
# …or a SLIM per-asset image — a container-only box does not need codeql/prowler:
docker pull ghcr.io/clattribe/tsengine/sandbox:repository-latest
# …or build it yourself:
make sandbox-image # → tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
# run a scan
./bin/tsengine scan --asset web_application --target https://example.com --image tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
# turn any output into a branded report; track it over time
./bin/tsengine report --in runs/<id>/vulnerabilities.json --format html --out report.html
./bin/tsengine findings ingest --db findings.json --in runs/<id>/vulnerabilities.json
./bin/tsengine findings list --db findings.json --open --overdue
The deployable surface (the tool-replay API webappsec calls) is tsengine serve:
export TSENGINE_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 24)
./bin/tsengine serve --addr :8080 --runs runs --image tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
| Endpoint | Auth | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
GET /healthz | none | liveness probe |
GET /readyz | none | readiness probe (runs dir writable) |
GET /version | none | build identity |
POST /replay | bearer | re-fire a tool against an existing scan (CLAUDE.md §9) |
Container image (tsengine serve + docker CLI baked in):
make host-image # → tsengine/host:dev
docker run -p 8080:8080 \
-e TSENGINE_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 24) \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
-v "$PWD/runs:/data/runs" \
tsengine/host:dev
Full operations guide — env vars, the docker-socket model, scaling, security hardening, k8s probes, release process — in docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
cmd/platform): env matrix, per-provider OAuth setup, Slack/Jira, onboarding, the API reference, the security model.scan · replay · serve · report · findings · import · export · ledger · reachability · gate · correlate · web-investigate / web-verify · cloud-investigate / cloud-assess · llm-redteam · pubkey / verify · corpus · version. Run tsengine with no args for usage.
Prioritization: tsengine correlate --in webscan.json --in cloudscan.json stitches findings across assets into a single attack chain to a crown jewel (e.g. a web SQLi that leaks an AWS key → the cloud IAM user it maps to → privilege escalation to admin) — grounded by the shared identifier, so no shared id means no chain.
Shift-left / CI: tsengine import pulls in another scanner's output (SARIF / Snyk / GitHub Dependabot); tsengine reachability answers "does our code actually call the vulnerable dependency function?"; tsengine gate turns scan / web-exploit / SCA-reachability findings into a pass/fail for your pipeline (gates on proof, not raw CVSS). So your existing Snyk/CodeQL results get the grounding + gate treatment. See docs/CI.md + the reusable .github/actions/tsengine-gate Action.
Outbound handoff: tsengine export --in scan.json --format sarif emits SARIF 2.1.0 so GitHub code-scanning (or any SARIF consumer) shows tsengine's proven findings inline on the PR ([verified] prefix, security-severity + CWE tags, file:line locations). tsengine export --in scan.json --webhook <url> [--webhook-token … --hmac-secret …] POSTs a normalized, signed (Bearer + HMAC-SHA256) finding/case event to a SIEM / SOC / AI-SOC / ticketing endpoint. The OUT mirror of import — tsengine is a finding source, not just a sink.
Agent decision ledger: every autonomous agent run (web-investigate / cloud-investigate / llm-redteam) can write a --ledger <file> — a signed, replayable record of every ReAct step (the model's thought, the tool it chose, the args, the deterministic observation). tsengine ledger replay <file> reconstructs the thought→tool→observation trail offline; tsengine ledger verify <file> proves no step was added, dropped, or altered after signing (ed25519, same scheme as the evidence bundle). Parity with an AI-SOC's "Investigation Ledger" — the trust/transparency layer.
make all # build + test + vet
make lint # golangci-lint
go test ./... # everything is unit-testable without infra (agents run a deterministic prober when no LLM key)
CI runs test (-race), vet, lint, and govulncheck on every PR. Direct push to main is blocked — ship via PR.