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A customer's security review is holding up the deal. An AI security engineer finds what an attacker could actually reach and writes the fix; an AI pentester proves it by breaking in. You approve every
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安全Go · TypeScriptGitHub @ClatTribe上線中營運者未確認
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一分鐘完成驗證Go-native L1 OSS security + compliance engine
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Go-native, two-layer security + compliance engine with evidence-grounded autonomous agents.檢視完整 README ↗
Go-native, two-layer security + compliance engine with evidence-grounded autonomous agents.
cloud-investigate) — attack-path reachability + verified remediation.web-investigate) — live exploitation; SQLi/XSS/open-redirect/path-traversal/cmdi; signed evidence bundle.llm-redteam) — jailbreak / secret-leak / tool-misuse, verified by tripwire.Each agent ships with an anti-circularity bench (procedurally-generated vulnerable + decoy targets): 100% recall, 0 false positives across seeds — the grounding is proven, not claimed.
Paired with webappsec (the SaaS wrapper that consumes tsengine output and talks to the service's /replay API).
# (cutting a release? see RELEASE.md — one v* tag fires two workflows and publishes twelve artifacts)
# build the version-stamped CLI
make cli # → ./bin/tsengine
./bin/tsengine version
# get the sandbox image (OSS tools live here, not on the host).
# PULL the published one (~5.8 GB, every scanner):
docker pull ghcr.io/clattribe/tsengine/sandbox:full-latest
# …or a SLIM per-asset image — a container-only box does not need codeql/prowler:
docker pull ghcr.io/clattribe/tsengine/sandbox:repository-latest
# …or build it yourself:
make sandbox-image # → tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
# run a scan
./bin/tsengine scan --asset web_application --target https://example.com --image tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
# turn any output into a branded report; track it over time
./bin/tsengine report --in runs/<id>/vulnerabilities.json --format html --out report.html
./bin/tsengine findings ingest --db findings.json --in runs/<id>/vulnerabilities.json
./bin/tsengine findings list --db findings.json --open --overdue
The deployable surface (the tool-replay API webappsec calls) is tsengine serve:
export TSENGINE_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 24)
./bin/tsengine serve --addr :8080 --runs runs --image tsengine/sandbox:0.1.0
| Endpoint | Auth | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
GET /healthz | none | liveness probe |
GET /readyz | none | readiness probe (runs dir writable) |
GET /version | none | build identity |
POST /replay | bearer | re-fire a tool against an existing scan (CLAUDE.md §9) |
Container image (tsengine serve + docker CLI baked in):
make host-image # → tsengine/host:dev
docker run -p 8080:8080 \
-e TSENGINE_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 24) \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
-v "$PWD/runs:/data/runs" \
tsengine/host:dev
Full operations guide — env vars, the docker-socket model, scaling, security hardening, k8s probes, release process — in docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
cmd/platform): env matrix, per-provider OAuth setup, Slack/Jira, onboarding, the API reference, the security model.scan · replay · serve · report · findings · import · export · ledger · reachability · gate · correlate · web-investigate / web-verify · cloud-investigate / cloud-assess · llm-redteam · pubkey / verify · corpus · version. Run tsengine with no args for usage.
Prioritization: tsengine correlate --in webscan.json --in cloudscan.json stitches findings across assets into a single attack chain to a crown jewel (e.g. a web SQLi that leaks an AWS key → the cloud IAM user it maps to → privilege escalation to admin) — grounded by the shared identifier, so no shared id means no chain.
Shift-left / CI: tsengine import pulls in another scanner's output (SARIF / Snyk / GitHub Dependabot); tsengine reachability answers "does our code actually call the vulnerable dependency function?"; tsengine gate turns scan / web-exploit / SCA-reachability findings into a pass/fail for your pipeline (gates on proof, not raw CVSS). So your existing Snyk/CodeQL results get the grounding + gate treatment. See docs/CI.md + the reusable .github/actions/tsengine-gate Action.
Outbound handoff: tsengine export --in scan.json --format sarif emits SARIF 2.1.0 so GitHub code-scanning (or any SARIF consumer) shows tsengine's proven findings inline on the PR ([verified] prefix, security-severity + CWE tags, file:line locations). tsengine export --in scan.json --webhook <url> [--webhook-token … --hmac-secret …] POSTs a normalized, signed (Bearer + HMAC-SHA256) finding/case event to a SIEM / SOC / AI-SOC / ticketing endpoint. The OUT mirror of import — tsengine is a finding source, not just a sink.
Agent decision ledger: every autonomous agent run (web-investigate / cloud-investigate / llm-redteam) can write a --ledger <file> — a signed, replayable record of every ReAct step (the model's thought, the tool it chose, the args, the deterministic observation). tsengine ledger replay <file> reconstructs the thought→tool→observation trail offline; tsengine ledger verify <file> proves no step was added, dropped, or altered after signing (ed25519, same scheme as the evidence bundle). Parity with an AI-SOC's "Investigation Ledger" — the trust/transparency layer.
make all # build + test + vet
make lint # golangci-lint
go test ./... # everything is unit-testable without infra (agents run a deterministic prober when no LLM key)
CI runs test (-race), vet, lint, and govulncheck on every PR. Direct push to main is blocked — ship via PR.